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Pressed to explain his current reputation, the Congressman cites "a built-in advantage, as a moderately successful football player," and a popular hunger for stronger political leadership. "I learned long ago," he declares, "that you can't quarterback a football team by taking a poll and following the consensus. You have to weigh risks, make judgments, take chances."

Mr. Kemp campaigned as a "let's tell what's right about America" Republican, and his House record thus far is rated as 100% by the American Conservative Union and 15% by the Americans for Democratic Action. Yet in recognition of Buffalo's high unemployment, he has supported several spending measures for larger than the White House wanted.

Mr. Kemp is at some pains to deny as "absurd" rumors that he'll be the Conservative Party challenger against Republican Sen. Jacob Javits in 1974. "I have a forum here to exert some leadership, and that's exactly where I want to be," he says. Clearly, though, a Senate seat some day is well within his downfield vision.

It's not going to be all clear going, of course. First re-elections are normally considered the toughest, though a coming reapportionment plan will probably make his district more Republican. More seriously, some colleagues rate Mr. Kemp still naive and prone to error. For example, they say, it may flatter his ego to debate Mr. McCloskey on television or to have Mr. Agnew speak for him, but these may not be such good politics in a district where many well-educated suburbanites don't particularly like the war or the Vice President. Other House members complain that he skimps on the nasty nitty-gritty of committee work, and that his fast, purposeful pace often leaves bruised feelings behind.

It usually takes three or four terms to know whether the comers actually live up to their early billing. A good many people will be watching to see whether Quarterback Kemp can still throw the long bomb.

THE ABM ISSUE AND THE SECURITY OF THE NATION

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, the charges made by Dr. Albert Wohlstetter and the Operations Research Society against the intellectual integrity of Dr. George Rathjens and Dr. Jerome Wiesner and other eminent scientists opposing the ABM were revived in a recent column by the estimable Joseph Alsop. The ABM issue is of undoubted importance to the security of the Nation. It is difficult enough to evaluate the claims made on behalf of the expensive and potentially destabilizing ABM without the intrusion of such regrettable charges to clear the air.

I ask unanimous consent that the column by Joseph Alsop, published in the Washington Post of November 8, 1971, and two letters in reply, one by Dr. Rathjens and the other by George Kisliakowsky, Herbert Scoville and Herbert E. York be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks. Dr. Kisliakowsky was formerly Science Adviser to President Eisenhower and a chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Dr. Scoville was formerly Deputy Director for Research, CJA, and Assistant Director at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. York was formerly Director, Defense Research and Engineering, DOD under President Eisenhower and a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1971]

MISLEADING SCIENTISTS

The clamor surrounding the underground nuclear test at Amchitka is a very good reason for offering an extremely solemn warning. On such occasions, a great deal of the more leftwing "scientific" evidence must now be expected to be as crooked as a ram's horn.

Some attention has already been given to the so-called ORSA report that contains the proofs of the foregoing extremely grave statement. But no one has even begun to grasp the full seriousness of this solid, stolid, unimpeachably factual report. So it deserves re-examination.

ORSA, in brief, is the Operations Research Society of America, with a membership of about 8,000 scientists doing defense and industrial research and analysis. One of the society's stated original aims was to establish uniform standards and guidelines for this new and growing branch of research.

Hence the society was interested when one of its members, Dr. Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago, asked for a panel to judge the standards of research and analysis displayed in the bitter debate about the "Safeguard" antiballistic-missile system in the Senate in 1969. Essentially that meant a panel to judge between ABM supporters like Dr. Wohlstetter, and its chief scientific opponents, such as the new president of MIT, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, and Drs. George Rathjens and Stephen Weinberg.

The ABM opponents were invited to make any contribution they chose, and also to nominate a member of the proposed panel. They haughtily refused to have anything to do with the inquiry. And they added a wholly groundless charge that the inquiry "could well appear to the nation as an ugly resurgence" of McCarthyism—but they ducked using the actual word.

A six-man panel of industrial and academic scientists was none the less formed, under the leadership of Thomas E. Caywood, past president of ORSA. The panel included men who had opposed the ABM in 1969, as well as men who had been for it. At least one former panel member, Dr. Howard M. Berger, of Xerox, "still hasn't made up his mind."

The results were devastating. "Analyses" that were "often inappropriate, misleading, or factually in error"; failure to meet "elementary standards for proper presentation of results to permit verification"; failure to "distinguish properly between the roles of analyst and advocate"—these were the main phrases in the summary of findings.

Dr. Rathjens was held guilty of "specific abuses of professional standards" in the ABM debate. He was further condemned for selecting his material in a most peculiar manner, mostly by omitting "data (that) would have substantially weakened his case". Other highly partisan inaccuracies were also found in his ABM testimony and in his subsequent exchanges with Dr. Wohlstetter.

Drs. Wiesner and Weinberg were found to have "ascribed official validity" to calculations which had no such validity. They were further found to have made extremely nasty false charges against the chief scientist of the Defense Department, Dr. John S. Foster.

Drs. Wiesner, Rathjens and Weinberg were jointly held to have been guilty of "misuse of source material" in the study of the ABM in a critique of the Pentagon's ABM position that was circulated by Senator Edward Kennedy. The same "misuse" was also found in the work done for Senator Kennedy by Dr. Wiesner and ABM charges throughout the ORSA report.

Thus placed in the dock and found guilty and crooking the evidence and purposeful varification, the anti-ABM scientists finally

condescended to notice ORSA more seriously. They issued a reply, admitting some mistakes, yet claiming they were right about what mattered. To this Dr. Rathjens added the charge that the neutral panel member, Dr. Herbert Berger, secretly harbored personal animus against himself.

To this charge, Dr. Berger has now replied, in effect, that Dr. Rathjens is again prevaricating, and again, Dr. Berger's evidence is solid, stolid and unimpeachably factual, like the ORSA report itself. No open-minded person can fail to read either report without concluding it is all too true, both in detail and in broad outline.

It needs only to be added that the supposed "mistakes" proven in the report were at the very heart of the ABM debate. In sum, warning.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1971]

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR ON THE OPERATIONS RESEARCH COMMITTEE REPORT AND THE ABM DEBATE

Joseph Alsop's column of November 8 for the most part accurately reflects the findings and tone of the recent critique by the Operations Research Society of America of the role of myself and others in the ABM debate. What Mr. Alsop failed to appreciate or convey to his readers was the fact that the ORSA report is a technically incompetent critique—based on bizarre procedural arrangements, selective use of evidence, and remarkably uncritical acceptance of administration assumptions, many of which had little or no foundation in fact.

This is not the place to discuss all of the deficiencies of the ORSA report—we have done that in some detail elsewhere—but lest readers be misled by Mr. Alsop's column, it is perhaps useful to comment on two issues in the ABM debate: the possible vulnerability of the U.S. Minuteman force to a Soviet SS-9 "first strike" in the mid-70's, and whether the Safeguard ABM deployment would make a significant difference in Minuteman survivability.

Although the second question was really what the ABM debate was all about, ORSA focused its attention almost exclusively on the first, a hardly surprising fact since Albert Wohlstetter who instigated the inquiry, and whose lead it slavishly followed, had largely avoided commenting on Safeguard's utility in both his testimony and his specification of changes.

As regards Minuteman vulnerability, I would point out that estimates necessarily had to be based on interpretation of intelligence information and technical judgment of what the situation would be six years later. Various participants in the debate made quite different judgments, and such differences, not mathematical manipulation which was essentially trivial, nor the application of esoteric operations research techniques, accounted for my estimating that 25 per cent of the Minuteman force would survive while Mr. Wohlstetter and Defense Department spokesmen estimated 5 per cent. I leave it to the reader to draw his own conclusion as to whose judgments were more reasonable, pointing out that I would now revise my estimates of Minuteman survivability upward as it now seems even less likely than it did two years ago that the U.S.S.R. could fully equip its SS-9 force with highly effective multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) by the mid-70's. Reports such as those by Michael Getler of a recent DOD/CIA sponsored study by TRW (The Washington Post, June 17), General Ryan's March 9 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, and Secretary Packard's remarks of October 21 lead me to believe that the administration too might now estimate very substantial survivability.

The administration seems also to have largely come around to the views of its opponents with regard to the question of Safe-

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The Uses of Adversity

By JAMES RESTON

Almost everybody seems to be moaning low these days about wages and prices, but one of the good things about the bad economic news is that it brings men in power back to reality. This is one of the uses of adversity: It compels long-delayed thought and action; it strips away slack practices, and enables institutions to face the awkward problems they usually evade in more prosperous days.

George Meany of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. knew all along that America couldn't afford his hawkish Vietnam policy, his policies on welfare, social security and wages, without pricing the nation out of the increasingly competitive world markets and running his workers out of jobs. He is no fool, but prosperity tolerates foolishness, and now that the consequences are coming in, he is sticking on the Pay Board with the outrageous argument that the fat cats are trying to drive him off it. Nevertheless, what prosperity failed to do, adversity is doing. George is putting up a big smoke screen but is retreating into common sense.

Similarly, the business conservatives have been proclaiming the glories of Adam Smith, the free market place and the wonders of competition; but now that the Japanese and the Germans have mated the arts of the computer and the scientific revolution with lower wages, the welfare state and the planned economy, they are slowly adjusting, like Mr. Meany, to controls. If it didn't hurt so much, it would be funny, for the Republicans are now backing controls, and the old Democratic New Dealers, who instituted them, are arguing for more freedom.

President Nixon has led this parade back to reality. It is easy to demonstrate that he has no clear political philosophy—which is a troubling thought—but at least he is not a prisoner of his past prejudices. He has made the historic and strategic opening to Peking, though following it with a dance of doubt and clumsy tactical moves to protect his right-wing Republican flank, but still he has made it.

And now, confronted with a potentially disastrous financial and trade problem in the world, he has finally scrapped his ideological approach to the Soviet Union and has sent off Secretary of Commerce Stans and a ten-man delegation to seek a substantial increase in trade with Moscow.

Like Mr. Meany, Mr. Nixon knew

all along that the ideological approach to trade didn't keep the Soviet Government from getting even the most sophisticated computers and scientific equipment from West Germany and Japan. After Willy Brandt made his peace with Moscow, and the Japanese started flying their commercial planes and sending their diplomatic and commercial agents to Moscow, the point was clear.

Even the most intricate American computers and other modern devices were going from Europe and Japan to the Soviet Union—all with the knowledge of the C.I.A., and years ago. But only when the American economy got into serious trouble in the world was it possible to face the fact.

Mr. Nixon reads the returns—economic as well as political. In the third quarter of 1971, the United States had the largest balance of payments deficit—the difference between what the country takes in and what it spends abroad—in the history of the Republic.

He is a traditional Republican. Every party has its nightmare, and the nightmare of the Republican party is economic trouble—after all, the Republicans were out of power for 28 out of 36 years because the Democrats exploited and ran successfully against "the Hoover Depression," and nobody knows this better than Richard Nixon.

Accordingly, it is no accident that the President has just approved \$528 million in export licenses to ship American equipment and technology to the Soviet Union's big new truck factory on the Kama River.

Not so long ago, he vetoed a deal to have Henry Ford enter into a similar contract with the Soviet Government, but that was when the economic slump at home didn't seem quite so ominous.

The objective facts are not really very different. Germany, Japan and Britain, among others, have been shipping sophisticated modern scientific and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union for years. Washington refused to do so, when it was prosperous, on ideological grounds; but since the recession and the unemployment, with an election coming up, it is taking a different view.

It is looking for business and votes. It is being forced by the bad economic news to do the things that it wanted to do, but could not quite do in good times, but is now forced to do when things are tough.